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The Board cross-appealed the sole issue regarding the Board's statutory authority to recover 
the attorney fees it incurred in investigation and prosecution of Williams's violations of the laws and 
rules regulating his profession, which the Board has a statutory duty to enforce. The Board presented 
its opening briefing in its Respondent's Brief filed January 2,2014. 
As a brief overview of the events leading up to the Board's Memorandum and Decision and 
Order on Costs and Fees, the Board filed its initial Complaint in November 2007, a hearing officer 
was appointed, and after initial pleadings and motions, in November 2008 Williams filed a petition 
for judicial review that this Court found was outside its jurisdiction to review in September 2010. 
Subsequently, on March 7, 2011, the Board filed an Amended Complaint and an Evidentiary 
Hearing was held over four days in August 2011. At the hearing both sides presented several 
witnesses, including expert witnesses from each party. On November 15, 2011, the hearing officer 
entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. Williams filed a motion 
for reconsideration and a motion for involuntary dismissal. The prosecutor responded to these 
motions. On February 27, 2012, the Board entered its Final Order adopting the hearing officer's 
findings and imposing discipline for Mr. Williams' misconduct and ordered, among other things, that 
Mr. Williams pay the attorney fees and costs associated with his violations. An Affidavit of Costs 
and Fees, including a statement of the prosecutorial attorney fees, was filed. Williams filed an 
objection and a supplement in opposition, a briefing schedule was set, and briefs by both parties were 
filed. Finally on August 2, 2012, the Board entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs 
and Fees addressing the issues before it and ordering Williams to pay the costs and fees incurred in 
the investigation and prosecution of his violations of the Board's law and rules. 
REPL Y BRIEF - 1. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A Fair Reading of the Statute and Rule Allowing Recovery of Prosecutorial Fees 
Demonstrates the Board's Authoritv to Recover the Prosecutors' Attorney Fees. 
The controlling law at issue is straightforward. Agencies act pursuant to statutory grants of 
authority. Abbot v. State Tax Commission, 88 Idaho 202, 205 (Idaho 1965). In doing so, agencies 
create rules for the operation and enforcement of the law in accordance with the expressed general 
purpose of those statutes. Id. 
Here, Idaho Code § 67-2609(a)(6) directly grants the Board the authority to promulgate rules 
to "recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution of a licensee." Accordingly, 
the Board did just as the statute envisioned and promulgated IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02, which states 
that the Board may recover "the costs and fees incurred by the Board in the investigation and 
prosecution of a licensee for violation [of its laws and rules]." Thus, the laws and rules governing 
the Board explicitly authorize the Board to recover the prosecutoriaI costs and fees associated with 
a licensee's violations of the laws and rules that the Board is charged with enforcing. Simply stated, 
the Board has the requisite authority to recover prosecutorial fees, and the Board acted pursuant to 
that authority to recover from Williams the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting Williams' 
violations. 
Williams attempts to inject ambiguity into this grant of authority to recover prosecutorial fees 
by proposing that an unexplained "distinction" exists between the kinds of fees under the rule he 
feels a violator may be responsible to pay and the kinds of fees, namely attorney fees, that he feels 
the violator should not be responsible to pay under the rule. 
REPL Y BRIEF - 2. 
Williams tries to create his "distinction" in the Board's rule by referring to terms in other 
agencies' statutes; although, these statutes do not have the legal effect of eliminating, modifying, or 
diminishing this agency's statutory authority. It is the language of this Board's statute and rule that 
establish its authority. 
Williams also attempts to support his argument by citing to Sanchez v. State Dept. of 
Correction, 143 Idaho 239 (Idaho 2006). However, Sanchez does not work to support his claim here. 
The Sanchez court determined that the statutory phrase, "such other remedy as may be deternlined 
to be appropriate," was too broad to authorize an award of attorney fees in a wrongful termination 
case in front of the Personnel Commission.ld. at 243-244. In its analysis, the court did not solely 
focus on the absence of the word "fees." Rather, the court also looked to the rest of the statute which 
read, the Commission "shall order the reinstatement of the employee ... , with or without loss of pay 
for the period of discharge, ... or may order such other remedy as may be determined to be 
appropriate." I.e. § 67-5316(4). Id. at 244. 
Specifically, the court examined the other remedies allowable in the statutory provision to 
determine whether attorney fees were a contemplated remedy. The court analyzed the statute stating: 
Where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such 
general words will be construed as meaning persons or things oflike or similar class 
or character to those specifically enumerated. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486, 
80 P.3d 1083, 1087 (2003). The statute specifically mentions reinstatement, with or 
without loss of pay. Nothing in that phrase would lead to the conclusion the 
legislature also intended to include an award of attorney fees as a possible "other 
remedy." A fair reading ofLe. § 67-5316(4) leads to the conclusion Sanchez is not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees." 
/d. Thus, the court's analysis did not stop at the fact the terms "fee" or "attorney fees" were not used; 
rather, it looked at the full context of the statute to determine whether attorney fees were authorized. 
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Here, the language of the statute does not contain the ambiguity or broad language of the 
statute in Sanchez or of those in the cases cited by the district court and discussed in the Board's/ 
Respondent's Cross-Appeal Brief. (See pp. 35-36.) The language of the rule at issue states in full: 
"Board may order a licensee or certified real estate appraiser to pay the costs and fees incurred by 
the Board in the investigation or prosecution of the licensee." First, the language unambiguously and 
specifically grants the Board the authority to recover its fees. Second, the term "fees" does not stand 
alone. The rest of the sentence further illuminates that the recoverable costs and fees are those 
incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the licensee. Prosecutorial fees commonly and 
necessarily include the attorney fees of the prosecutor. This is the only limiting language of the type 
of fees that the violator may be ordered to pay. Thus, a fair reading of the statute and rule at issue 
shows that the allowable costs and fees are those that are incurred in the investigation and 
prosecution of a violation; attorney fees are certainly not excluded from the prosecutorial fees that 
the Board is authorized to recover. 
In short, the language of the laws and rules governing the Board specifically authorizes the 
recovery of prosecutorial fees, which fairly includes the attorney fees expended in prosecuting a 
licensee for his violations of the laws and rules governing his license. 
R The Board's Determination of the Fees Ordered Was Not an Abuse of Discretion. 
Williams attempts to assail the Board's Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees 
as an abuse of its discretion on several matters underlying its ultimate decision ordering Williams 
to pay the costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his violations. He re-hashes 
and re-argues the issues presented to the Board asking this Court to re-decide those issues. However, 
he misses the mark when examined under the Court's applicable standard of review, which is 
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whether the Board abused its discretion in making its decision. Ultimately, Williams' claims do not 
establish an abuse of discretion by the Board in considering, apportioning, and ordering attorney fees 
and costs. 
1. The Board's Decision Was in Compliance With the Directives of Haw. 
An agency's decision will be upheld by a reviewing court when the agency "perceived the 
issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to available choices, and reached its OvvTI decision through an exercise 
of reason." Haw v. Idaho State Board ofAledicine, 143 Idaho 51, 54 (Idaho 2006). As discussed by 
the Board in its opening brief on cross-appeal on this issue, the Board followed the Haw court's 
guiding principles in its determination of how to award fees and costs in this case. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 37-39.) 
In objecting to the Board's conclusion on this matter, Williams is asking this Court to engage 
in what the Haw court found to be unnecessary: adding up the claims and calculating with 
mathematical precision who won the most claims. 143 Idaho at 54. To the contrary, Haw requires 
the Board to engage in a "meaningful analysis" and to take into account its overall success in 
apportioning fees and costs. As thoroughly discussed in the Respondent's Brief, the Board engaged 
in such an analysis (pp. 37-38 (referencing the Board's Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs 
and Fees (R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H)). 
The Board has complied with the directions in Haw, and the apportionment offees is not an 
abuse of discretion. As explained in its brief, the Board here perceived that its decision ,,,ith respect 
to fees and costs was discretionary. The Board acted within the outer limits of its discretion and 
consistent with legal standards applicable to the available choices. And, the Board undertook an 
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exercise of reason in reaching its decision, as evidenced by the analysis in the Memorandum 
Decision itself. Williams has not established otherwise, 
2. The Board Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Determining That the ProsecutoriaI 
Hours Were Reasonable as Requested. 
Williams argues that because the cumulative hours claimed by the prosecution counsel is 
greater than the number incurred by his own counsel, that the prosecution hours are excessive and 
unreasonable. Specifically, Williams contends that because prosecution counsel for the Board 
changed during the pendency of the proceeding, that this turnover and the necessary time it took new 
counsel to become familiar with the case should reflect some sort of discount in the award of fees. 
The Board declined to adjust its award based on these factors. Instead, the Board determined 
that it did not believe "the total number of hours given the nature of the case are unreasonable, 
especially considering the hourly rate charged by the State's attorneys, the nature and complexity of 
the case, and the fact that [Williams] is only responsible to pay less than 50 percent of the total 
amount due." (R. Agency Cat" Second Supplement, Attachment H, p. 10.) More so, with respect to 
Williams' arguments regarding turnover in prosecution counsel, the Board found that "considering 
the fact that the State's attorneys did contribute to the prosecution of this matter; that the significant 
delay in the case resulting from Respondent's appeal l would have required some additional case 
review by counsel; and since the amount oftheir fees constitute less than 12 percent of attorneys' fees 
sought, said amounts are deemed reasonable and appropriate." Id., at 11. 
IThis appeal was the first judicial review in this case with Judge McKee, with a subsequent 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which found the appeal premature given the posture of the case. 
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The Board's analysis and conclusions are reasonable. Turnover of counsel is not uncommon 
in cases that span seven years, particularly where it is the Idaho Attorney General's office that 
handles the prosecution. In this present case, attorneys Michael Gilmore and Melissa Moody initially 
handled the case and spent a total of 97.87 hours, whereupon attorneys Rob Adelson and Kathy 
Takasugi assumed responsibility and spent a combined 738.47 hours on the case. (See R. Agency, 
Vol. II, Tab No. 97, Affidavit of Cost and Fees, Exh. A, p. 40 of 40.) As the Board duly noted, the 
time spent by the initial two attorneys is very small in comparison to the time spent by the final two 
attorneys who eventually handled the case. Williams does not assert how much time he believes 
should be deducted based on this turnover, nor does he explain a basis for such. More so, the delay 
in this case caused by Williams' own initial petition for judicial review and subsequent appeal cannot 
be penalized against the Board. Thus, the Board's findings and decision must be upheld. 
3. The Board's Consideration ofthe Affidavit of Costs and Fees Was Not an Abuse 
of Discretion. 
Williams disagrees with the Board's decision to consider the Affidavit of Costs and Fees that 
was provided six days after the original deadline given by the Board to do so. Williams argues this 
was an abuse of the Board's discretion. Yet, the Board's decision and reasoning meet the standard 
of review and therefore were not an abuse of discretion. See Haw, 143 Idaho at 54. 
IDAP A 04.11.0 1.7 41.02( d) provides: "The agency may exercise its discretion to consider and 
grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown." Upon analyzing Williams' 
objections to the late filing, and in the discretion afforded it, the Board determined there was good 
cause shown for the untimely filing, and allowed it to be considered. Williams may have a different 
opinion on what circumstances constitute good cause, but the determination is firmly committed to 
the discretion of the Board and the Board properly exercised that discretion. 
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First, the Board found that Williams had suffered no actual prejudice by having the late filing 
considered. Williams was allowed to fully brief his objections, and he was given full and timely 
notice of the Affidavit of Katherine Takasugi before the deadline expired. The delay in filing was 
only six days, and the Board found that the reason for the delay-an error in calendaring due to the 
Board's not utilizing the typical 45-day period normally used for such orders-was excusable. And 
significantly, the Board found that to deny the costs and fees because of the missed deadline would 
be unjust given the nature of the Board's disciplinary authority and the licensees it serves. (See R. 
Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H, pp. 11-12.) 
Here again, the Board did not abuse its discretion in allowing the untimely filing for fees and 
costs, where it: (l) understood that its decision on this matter was one of discretion (relying upon 
IDAPA 04.l1.01.741.02(d), which specifically identifies this as an issue of discretion); (2) acted 
within the outer limits of its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to the available 
choices (where the Board was permitted by rule to allow the untimely filing for fees and costs based 
on a finding of good cause); and (3) the Board clearly undertook an exercise of reason in reaching 
its decision, as evidenced by the analysis in the Memorandum Decision. 
4. The Board's Consideration of the Peel and Stevenson Affidavits Was 
Appropriate. 
Finally, Williams objects to the Board having considered the Affidavits of Lori Peel and 
Dennis Stevenson, claiming that because they were filed beyond the 30-day deadline2 for filing for 
2 Williams' briefing misstates or misunderstands the applicable rule, stating that "it is 
particularly noteworthy that the 30-day deadline set by the Board ... was far in excess of the default 
14-day deadline set forth in IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a)." Petitioner's Reply Brief on Appeal, p. 27 
(emphasis in original). The rule actually states, "the agency must allow no fewer than fourteen (14) 
days from the service date of the final order." IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a). The rule does not set a 
default deadline and only prevents an agency from giving less than 14 days. Hence, allowing 30 or 
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fees and costs they should not have been considered. Such a contention is without merit. The Peel 
and Stevenson affidavits were specifically filed in support of the State's response to Williams' 
objections to attorney fees and costs. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachments D and 
E.) Both affidavits were filed in response to Williams' objections that were based on the untimeliness 
of the filing for fees and costs. As such, to say that these affidavits, which were submitted to 
establish a good cause for the untimeliness of the application for fees and costs, should have been 
filed before the application became untimely, is illogical. 
More so, Williams was given more than adequate opportunity to address the substance of 
these affidavits, and he did so through a Reply in Support of Objection to Award of Attorney Fees 
and Costs (R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment F), and his Objection to the State's 
Motion to Extend Time to File the Affidavit of Costs and Fees (R. AgencyCert., Second Supplement, 
Attachment G). Thus, there can be no error in the allowance of the Peel and Stevenson affidavits. 
5. The Board Properly Fulfilled its Prosecutorial and Adjudicatory Functions. 
Throughout his briefing, Williams appears to attempt to raise an inference of bias or 
impropriety in the Board's fulfillment of its adjudicatory role and of its prosecutorial role and at 
times conflates these two distinct functions. 3 However, Williams has not produced any evidence of 
actual bias, and the statutory framework under which the Board fulfills its many roles does not make 
its decisions suspect. 
more days is in keeping with the tenets of the rule. 
3 Examples of such language include "its decision to award itself the entirety of its own 
claimed attorney fees" (Petitioner's Reply Brief, p. 20) and "the Board requested, and not surprisingly 
the Board granted to itself .... " (Petitioner's Reply Brief, p. 29.) 
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The Board was legislatively created as a self-governing, self-supporting agency to regulate 
the profession of real estate appraisers for the purpose of "safeguard[ing] life, health and property 
and to promote the public welfare." I.C. §§ 54-4102,54-4106. In creating the agency, the legislature 
assigned the Board duties that include those of a prosecutorial nature-necessary to the enforcement 
of the Board's laws and rules-as well as those of an adjudicatory nature, such as considering and 
entering a final order. Williams does not dispute that the Board has been properly entrusted with 
these powers and is authorized to carry out these functions. 
Moreover, this Court has expressly addressed this same statutory structure in this same issue 
finding that it does not create any bias, suspicion, or violation of due process. Staff of Idaho Real 
Estate Com'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 636-637 (Idaho 2001). The Court found that an agency's 
decision to award itself attorney fees upon its own determination that a licensee violated its laws and 
rules was not suspect or improper and that any potential for a conflict of interest was removed by the 
opportunity for judicial review.ld. at 637. 
Here, the Board has fulfilled its separate duties by utilizing a prosecutor and the 
administrative services of the Bureau and also carried out its adjudicatory functions as a Board by 
making a final decision after considering the submissions of Williams and the prosecutor, and its 
decisions are subject to judicial review. Any implication that the Board acted improperly, or its 
decision is suspect because it fulfilled these statutorily created roles, is unfounded and has previously 
been rejected this Court. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision 
regarding the Board's recovery of the attorney fees it incurred in the prosecution of Williams' 
violations of the Real Estate Appraisers Act and uphold the Board's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Costs and Fees because the Board had the authority to recover its fees and did not abuse 
its discretion in determining and ordering the award of costs and fees. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2014. 
By 
% Castleton 
Attornexs for Respondent 
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